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Virtual Machine Introspection Based Malware
Behavior Profiling and Family Grouping
Shun-Wen Hsiao, Yeali S. Sun, and Meng Chang Chen
Abstract—The proliferation of malwares have been attributed
to the alternations of the original malware source codes. The
malwares alternated from the same origin share some intrinsic
behaviors and form a malware family. Expediently, identifying its
malware family when a malware is first seen can provide useful
clues to mitigating the threat. In this paper, a malware profiler
(VMP) is proposed to profile the execution behaviors of a malware
at the runtime by leveraging the virtual machine introspection
(VMI) technique. The VMP inserts a plug-in inside the virtual
machine monitor (VMM) to record the invoked Windows API
calls with the parameters and return values as the profile of
a malware. Based on the profiles, we then adopt a distance
measurement and a phylogenetic tree construction method to
discover the malware behavior groups. As expected, our study
shows the malwares from a malware family are similar to each
other and distinct from other malware families as well as the
benign software. We then examines the goodness of the family
grouping method of the VMP against existing anti-malware
detection engines and some well-known grouping methods. We
propose a novel peer voting method for evaluating the result of
family grouping and the evaluation shows VMP is better than
almost all of the compared anti-malware engines. At last, we
establish a malware profiling website based on the proposed VMP
for the public use.
Index Terms—Behavior profiling, behavior grouping, malware
family, virtual machine introspection.
I. INTRODUCTION
A malware (or malicious software) [1], such as computervirus, Internet worm, trojan horse, and botnet, is devel-
oped to be planted into a target host stealthily by exploiting
software vulnerability or employing social engineering plots
in order to disrupt infected host operation or network service,
modify or destroy software or data, steal sensitive information,
or take control of the host. The loss, tangible or intangible,
from the damages caused by malware, is so drastic that
effective malware defense solutions are direly demanded.
The construction of malware requires intensive knowledge
in the computer and network systems, as well as programming
skill. Consequently, the current practices of the proliferation
of malware programs are mostly from modifying existing
malwares or being custom-built by the culprits who control
the program codes. The malwares alternated from the same
origin share some intrinsic behaviors. By knowing the origin
of a newly detected malware, it helps to forge a solution to
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mitigate or neutralize the malware planted in the infected
hosts, or even to trace back to the attack origin. We call
the malwares rooted from the same origin as a malware
family, and the grouping same behavior into a malware family
becomes a critical issue in malware detection, defense, and
forensics. The purpose of this paper is to propose a virtual
machine introspection (VMI) [2], [3] based solution to profile
the runtime behavior of malwares in terms of Windows API
call sequences. Then, we investigate the behavior grouping
phenomenon of the malwares by the generated profiles with
a hierarchical clustering method to reveal the malware family
structure. A Pairwise Classification Score (PCS) method is
proposed to evaluate the goodness of different malware family
classification results. Our study provide a solution includes
runtime profiling, behavior grouping and classification evalu-
ation, which is different from most of the previous works in
malware detection or behavior analysis.
Once a new malware is detected, a security expert needs
to answer certain critical questions, such as “how was the
malware planted into the infected host?”, “did it access any
important or private information?”, “did it change any system
configuration?”, “is this malware similar to any known mal-
ware?”, “can we rely on past solutions to mitigate it?” in order
to appraise possible incurred damages and curate a solution to
mitigate or neutralize the malware. It is not trivial to answer
the questions by examining the infected system, reviewing the
system log and malware binary. It needs properly designed
tools to monitor malware execution, analyze its behavior,
identify its unique characteristics, cross-validate with other
known malwares, and identify its malware family to assist
security experts to fully explore the malware. The proposed
VMP scheme is designed to achieve the above goals from
profiling to analyzing.
Fig. 1 presents the behavior of a bot malware, W32.Morto.A
found in late 2011, with its attack procedure and the execution
trace at the infected host. The figure shows the runtime
infection procedure that W32.Morto.A exploits a vulnerable
host (step 1), creates and launches a temporary malicious
process in the infected host (step 2), obtains malware binary
from network (step 3), replaces benign system files (step 4),
and makes itself as a resident service (step 5) after next system
boot up (step 6). During the infection process, the bot performs
message exchanges when it tries to control the host, creates
a malicious process and modifies the registries to load the
malicious code, which is useful for further analysis to identify
the behavior of malware and its family.
In practice, there are two main streams of malware behavior
analysis: static analysis and dynamic analysis [1], [4]. The
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HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\
Sens\Parameters\ServiceDll = 
%SystemRoot%\sens32.dll 
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\
6to4\Parameters\ServiceDll = 
%windir%\temp\ntshrui.dll 
(6) Reboot and 
       infection completion. 
Fig. 1: The infection procedure of W32.Morto.A.
static analysis focuses on analyzing the program code to
generate static execution flow without actually executing the
program and, in some case, seek for any possible logic flaws,
coding errors, and vulnerable codes [5], [6]. On the other hand,
the dynamic analysis [1], [7] executes the target program to
facilitate the collection of execution trace in various execution
contexts. Although the dynamic analysis approach may not
run the program in all possible contexts, it is still the only
approach to obtain runtime comprehend malware behavior,
such as receiving a message from Internet, loading an external
library and deleting files at the runtime.
Traditionally, dynamic analysis is often performed by em-
ploying software sandbox [8] or virtual machine (VM), that
both provide certain isolation between the target program and
the host. Sandbox is a simulated execution environment with
tight control, while a virtual machine is a hardware/software
emulation of a computer system that user is able to install its
own guest operating system to execute the target program as
if it ran on a physical machine.
A malware profile is a collection of information collected
during the malware execution, adequate for further analysis,
and malware profiling is the methodology and mechanism
to generate a malware profile. The prerequisite of malware
profiling is to have a system to be able to monitor, control
and perform instructed instrumentation, and to make the
execution environment as close to a real machine as possible.
Consequently, the virtual machine technique is preferred in
this study as it meets the above requirements. In addition, the
virtual machine allows custom-made plug-ins to be embedded
in the virtual machine monitor to facilitate execution trace
extraction, which adds flexibility in malware profiling.
Rather than recording the low-level CPU instructions or
system calls as the profiling subject, our profiler provides a
higher level execution semantics — Windows Application Pro-
gramming Interface (Windows API) — to describe a Windows
malware behavior. From the past malware behavior analysis
results [?], [8], malwares may use Windows APIs to access
system resources, such as files, process, network information,
and the registry. Hence, we hook the Windows API functions
at the virtualization layer (i.e., VMM) to intercept the targeted
malware at the runtime and record its invoked API calls.
Moreover, we implemented a dynamic hooking mechanism
that can retrieve the parameters and return value of a Windows
APIs from the runtime stack, which needs to dedicate control
of instrumentation and the traversal of memory.
It is common that hundred millions of CPU instructions
are executed within minutes, which is overloaded and te-
dious for behavior analysis. The history of invoked sys-
tem calls of a program is a reasonable alternative, which
can be obtained from virtual machine straightforwardly [9].
However, with system calls alone, it still loses high-level
information for security experts to comprehend the mal-
ware intents. Even with raw parameters, it still lacks se-
mantic information for profile analysis. For instance, with
system call NtOpenFile(0x6c040000, 0x1001000,
0x74e20502, ...), it indicates the program opens a file
from a path string pointed by 0x74e20502 with access right
0x1001000, and gets a file handler stored in 0x6c040000.
However, reading such low-level information is not an easy
work.
On the contrary, using Windows API sequences as a pro-
file could reveal clear semantics of execution. For instance,
LoadLibrary(’SHELL32.dll’) clearly specifies the file
SHELL32.dll to be opened and loaded is a shared li-
brary. For another example, CreateFile(’s7785.exe’,
GENERIC_WRITE) specifies the file s7785.exe is created
for writing. Hence, the proposed VMP system is designed
to obtain all such semantics associated with APIs and their
parameters. (Note that in this paper, Microsoft Windows and
Windows API are used as examples to exemplify the proposed
design, while the design can be implemented in another
context, such as Linux and C library.)
From the past malware behavior analysis works [8], [10]–
[13], malwares use APIs to access system resources, in-
cluding file, process, network, Windows registry, etc. These
APIs provide categorized services and libraries [14] to offer
convenience to programmers; security experts can grasp the
semantics of APIs, and further infer the intents of malwares.
Fig. 2 is a partial malware profile generated by the proposed
VMP of a variant in the Morstar family that it shows some
meta data (between line 3 to 7 that specifies the MD5 value and
the process ID of the target malware, and the profiling duration
is 300 seconds) and a few invoked Windows APIs with input
parameters and return values, as well as the timestamps, to
exemplify the format and content of malware profile. From
the profile, it can be seen clearly that the Morstar variant
successfully creates a file s7785.exe (at line 9), and loads
SHELL32.dll (at line 10). Then it checks and sets registry
value for s7785.exe (at lines 11 and 12), and finally creates
a process to run s7785.exe (at line 13). Note that the
spawned process will be recorded by the VMP in a separate
profile as well.
Multiple malware profiles are then used for similarity
analysis to group similar malwares into the associated mal-
ware behavior group (or simply ‘behavior family’). Then, the
characteristics of each malware group can be extracted by
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1 <?xml version="1.0"?>
2 <Profile>
3 <Meta>
4 <Hash>61fd4cac9f5429d14d015e7632e3514a</Hash>
5 <Process_id>1524</Process_id>
6 <Duration>300</Duration>
7 </Meta>
8 <Execution>
9 <CreateFile hName="C:\DOCUME˜1\ants\LOCALS˜1\
Temp\n7785\s7785.exe" desiredAccess="
GENERIC_WRITE" creationDisposition="
CREATE_ALWAYS" Return="SUCCESS" Time="
317560000" />
10 <LoadLibrary lpFileName="SHELL32.dll" Return=
"SUCCESS" Time="339720000" />
11 <RegQueryValue hKey="HKCU\Software\Microsoft\
Windows\ShellNoRoam\MUICache\C:\DOCUME˜1\
ants\LOCALS˜1\Temp\n7785\s7785.exe" Return
="FAILURE" Time="341100000" />
12 <RegSetValue hKey="HKCU\Software\Microsoft\
Windows\ShellNoRoam\MUICache\C:\DOCUME˜1\
ants\LOCALS˜1\Temp\n7785\s7785.exe" type="
REG_SZ" data="install manager" Return="
SUCCESS" Time="341350000" />
13 <CreateProcessInternal lpApplicationName="C:\
DOCUME˜1\ants\LOCALS˜1\Temp\n7785\s7785.
exe" lpCommandLine="C:\DOCUME˜1\ants\
LOCALS˜1\Temp\n7785\s7785.exe ins.exe /
e11831362 /u50d1d9d5-cf90-407c-820a-35
e05bc06f2f /v" Return="SUCCESS"
dwProcessId="1276" dwThreadId="1272" Time
= "341600000" />
14 </Execution>
15 </Profile>
Fig. 2: A (partial) malware profile example of a variant in
Morstar family.
identifying the common behaviors among its group members.
In this study, the Jaccard Similarity Coefficient is adopted
for similarity analysis, and a phylogenetic tree of malwares
is generated to exhibit the family structure and similarities
among family members. This work provides a new enabling
technique to better understand the malware behavior that is
anticipated to complement the existing malware detection and
defense techniques.
There are several novel design principles implemented in
the proposed malware profiling and analysis system.
• Taint tracking. The design of VMP is influenced by
the concept of tainted analysis [12] to track the access
entities, e.g., file and registry. For example, if a process
reads a file that was previously written by the targeted
malware, the profiling system will also automatically
profile this process.
• Spawned process. The spawned processes created by
malware process are tracked as well. A sophisticated
malware might launch multiple processes to accomplish
a job cooperatively that tracking spawned processes to
give a complete view of the malware.
• Runtime value. The VMP system not only records the
names of invoked API but also retrieves the memory stack
and CPU registers to obtain API parameters and return
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Fig. 3: The overview of the proposed automated malware
profiling and analysis system.
values.
• Transparency. The profiling system is embedded in the
VMM as a part of virtualization software so that the
targeted malware may not aware of the existence of
our profiling mechanism, and will not take defense or
deceiving activities.
• Behavior group analysis. The malware profile is use-
ful for functional, structural, and evolutionary malware
discovery. The phylogenetic tree composes malware be-
havior families and presents their relationships.
• Novel evaluation method for malware classification.
As there is no benchmark or golden rule for malware
family grouping, a peer voting based evaluation for mal-
ware classification is proposed to appraise the grouping
goodness of different anti-malware detection engines. It
also solves the problem of different naming mechanisms
used by different anti-virus engines, so that we can com-
pare the classification results among different engines.
To summarize, in this work, a VMI-based Malware Profiler,
VMP, is proposed to automatically record the execution trace
of malware running in a virtual machine that it allows the
API hooks to access high-level semantic parameter values to
provide superior capability in malware family grouping and to
understand malware family construction. In the experiments,
with the proposed Pairwise Classification Score (PCS) method,
the VMP grouping results can reveal the structure of malwares
and exceed the classification results of most well-known anti-
malware engines. At last, we establish a malware profiling
website based on the proposed VMP for the public use.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we present the proposed automated malware pro-
filing scheme. Section III is the detail design and operation
of the VMP. Section IV introduces the malware behavior
analysis and behavior grouping methods. The evaluation of the
behavior analysis result is in Section V, as well as the Pairwise
Classification Score result. In Section VI, we review existing
works of malware behavior profiling and analysis. Section VII
contains some concluding remarks and the future works.
II. AUTOMATED MALWARE PROFILING
The functional diagram of VMP is shown in Fig. 3. The
automation process of malware profiling has three phases:
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preparation, execution, and collection. In the preparation
phase, the Profiling Agent prepares a VM image for a malware
to be profiled. In the execution phase, it boots the VM and
executes the malware; immediately, the profiling plug-in starts
to record the execution information into the profile. In the
collection phase, the profile is saved in the host, and the VM
is terminated and deleted. Most of the automation scripts are
implemented in Python.
1) Preparation Phase: The Profiling Agent inserts a mal-
ware binary into a clean virtual machine image (step 1 in
Fig. 3). Then, it boots the virtual machine by VMM (i.e.,
QEMU) with the profiling plug-ins (step 2). The Profiling
Agent commands and controls the virtual machine via a
specific protocol supported by the VMM (step 3). The VMM
boots the guest OS in a newly created VM (step 4), where
the inserted malware will be executed and the plug-ins start
to record execution information for later analysis (step 5).
2) Execution Phase: It is not trivial to control the guest
OS from the outside of a VM, especially when the Profiling
Agent sometimes needs to interact with the running malware.
The VMP system extends the QEMU monitor [15] to let the
Profiling Agent be able to interact with the VM and the guest
OS. The QEMU Machine Protocol (QMP) [16] is implemented
in the Profiling Agent to send commands to VMM to control
the execution of the VM, e.g., specifying target process, taking
screen shots, turning on or off the network, moving and
clicking the virtual mouse, suspending the VM, and controlling
various aspects of the VM.
The Profiling Agent also issues commands via QMP to load
a customized plug-in into TEMU/QEMU (Note that TEMU
is an extension of QEMU [12], [13]), which implements the
callback functions for handling hooked Windows APIs. An
automation script is implemented to control the virtual mouse
and the keyboard attached to the VM using QMP as if a
user manually interacts with the malware running in the VM.
For recording network packets generated by the malware, a
Wireshark client (t-shark) [17] is installed prior to capturing
both incoming and outgoing packets. The execution phase
performs the following tasks.
• Load customized hooking plug-in into TEMU/QEMU.
• Specify the targeted malware.
• Load customized callback functions into VMM.
• Start Wireshark client to capture packets.
• Launch the malware by virtual mouse and keyboard
controls.
3) Collection Phase: After execution phase, the Profiling
Agent suspends the VM via QMP and collects the output,
i.e., malware profile, which contains the sequence of hooked
Windows API calls, a network log file having a list of network
connections with source and destination IPs and network
protocols, a file of the captured packets, and screen dump files
of the VM. Although all the information collected above is
useful for malware behavior analysis, this paper only focuses
on the profile(i.e., the sequence of API calls).
The Analysis Agent then runs the Analysis Script which
contains the implementation of similarity analysis algorithm
and the phylogenetic tree construction method for identifying
malware behavior groups. It then writes all the results into
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Profiling Plug-in 
Process Tracking 
Behavior 
Profile 
Database 
Log 
Execution 
API Hooking 
Fig. 4: A virtualized environment with plug-in instrumentation.
the Analysis Report (step 6). If necessary, a script will be
executed to calculate the Pairwise Classification Score for all
generated profiles. Note that the Reference Database in Fig. 3
is retrieved from VirusTotal.com [18] as a reference when we
calculate the PCS.
III. VMP: VIRTUAL MACHINE PROFILER
This section describes the design and implementation of
process tracking and API hooking of the virtual machine
introspection based profiler. In a virtualized environment (Fig.
4), a guest OS runs on a virtual machine created by the VMM.
The VMP system is built on the top of QEMU [15], a free
and open source to support fine-grained instrumentation at the
runtime. The I/O and CPU instructions of the guest OS are all
intercepted and handled by the VMM, and then are executed
by the physical machine.
The profiling plug-in is implemented in the VMM to
monitor the interactions between the guest OS and the VMM
without modifying the OS, and also reduce the risk of being
detected by the malware. Another benefit is that such design
can profile all the virtual machines under the same VMM.
Since the plug-ins can only read low-level VM information
(i.e., CPU instruction and memory), it should bridge the
semantic gap [19] between the low-level data and the high-
level API semantics .
The plug-in is about 3000 LOC (lines of code) written
in C and C++. In addition, we modified around 1000 LOC
of TEMU/QEMU to support tracking multiple processes si-
multaneously, which is not supported by the original version
of TEMU/QEMU. In addition, for each hooked API, we
implemented a customized callback function to retrieve its
runtime parameters and return values, such as the name of
libraries and files, the key of Windows registry, and the failure
or success of API calls.
The functionalities of the plug-in are as follows.
1) Target Process: The plug-in should be able to identify
the target process and track all its spawned child processes.
In the guest kernel, each process has a unique identifier,
PID to represent the process. When a process is running, the
process has a unique address base stored in the CPU register,
CR3 (which is used for translating virtual address to physical
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Fig. 5: The execution flow of the profiling plug-in
TABLE I: List of Hooked Windows APIs
File Registry Process Library
CreateFile RegCloseKey CreateProcess LoadLibrary
ReadFile RegQueryValue CreateProcessInternal
WriteFile RegOpenKey OpenProcess
DeleteFile RegCreateKey ExitProcess
CopyFile RegDeleteKey WinExec
CloseHandle RegSetValue CreateRemoteThread
RegEnumValue
address). The profiling system acquires the CR3 value and
creates a mapping (step 1 in Fig. 5) between the CR3 value
and the PID. In this case, when the target process is about to
running on the virtual CPU, we can start the profiling process.
Since QEMU runs as an emulator, it can check out every
instruction before execution. In order to reduce overhead, in
VMP, a check-out function is designed that it is executed
only before the virtual CPU switches to the next process (i.e.,
changes the CR3 value). If the next process is one of our target
processes, the Process Tracking module is activated (step 2). If
the target process spawns a child process by calling a Windows
API (e.g., CreateProcess or WinExec), the PID of the
newly spawned process will be added to the tracking list (step
3).
2) Target API: The plug-in should be able to hook the
designated Windows API calls. Before executing the malware
in the VM, plug-ins and their call back functions are already
loaded and to be invoked when corresponding Windows APIs
are called by the malware. Forty-three Windows APIs are
hooked in the current VMP system, which is categorized into
File, Registry, Process, and Library related APIs, as in Table I.
Some Windows APIs have variants, e.g., CreateFileA and
CreateFileW are variants, that only one of them is listed.
To obtain better performance, when QEMU executes the
guest codes, it slices the codes into basic blocks, which is
a block of instructions terminated by a jump or virtual CPU
state change and QEMU executes the basic block as an unit.
When a process calls a Windows API function, the instruction
in the basic block is exactly a jump to the first instruction of
the API function. Hence, the VMP checks if the address of the
next instruction (stored in EIP register) is any of the address
of our hooked APIs (step 4) before executing a basic block.
If the address matches (which means the next instruction will
jump to one of the hooked API), then the corresponding call
back function is invoked.
3) Runtime Value Retrieval: When the CPU jumps to the
first instruction of the hooked API function, the call stack
already stores the input parameters of this call pointed by the
ESP (Extended Stack Pointer) register (step 5). The profiler
then gets the parameters from the stack. The number of param-
eters and data types must be pre-specified in the corresponding
call back functions to correctly decode the memory stack. In
addition, some Windows APIs use a handle to represent a
resource, e.g., a file handle (HANDLE hFile) or a registry
handle (HKEY hKey). They are basically integers that are
meaningless for postmortem analysis. Hence, the VMP system
also maintains a mapping table to map resource handles to
their original resources, i.e., a file name or a registry key name,
when they are opened at the first time.
The VMP profiling system, at the end of call back function,
also reads the return address of this API function from the
stack, and stores it in an internal monitoring list, called
Dynamic Hooks. We will also hook this address for retrieving
the return values of this API call. Because after the codes
of this API are executed, CPU will jump back to this return
address for executing next instruction. At that moment, the
return values of the hooked API is at the EAX register and
the call-by-reference parameters is in the stack (step 6). That
is how do we obtain the return values. Then, we remove this
return address from the Dynamic Hooks and records all these
parameters and return values in the profile. Finally, the CPU
continues to execute the next basic block.
In this way, the high-level semantic information (e.g., Win-
dows API names and human-readable parameters) is obtained
by bridging certain low-level information (e.g., register and
call stack values). Take a Windows API call CreateFile
for example (see Fig. 2), to bridge the semantic gaps, the
profiling plug-in needs to 1) locate the memory address of
the CreateFile API binary codes of the target process, 2)
monitor the virtual CPU’s EIP register to trigger the hook
callback function, 3) translate the binary values in the call
stack to human readable values (e.g., 0x00000010 at the fifth
byte from call stack base is translated to CREATE_ALWAYS),
4) perform dynamic hook for each API call to retrieve the
return values, and 5) maintain an internal resource-handle
mapping table, where the file names and the corresponding file
handles are stored. Thus, the plug-in can output the actual file
name (or registry key) in the profile, rather than a handle value.
Consequently, a human-readable, high-level, and meaningful
behavior profile for each process is populated, as shown in
Fig. 2.
IV. MALWARE BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS
In this paper, a malware profile is composed of an API
execution sequence that many analysis methods can be used
to analyze the similarity [20] between two API execution
sequences for malware family grouping. It is noted that a
malware family usually contains many variants, which may
be due to the reasons of bug fixing, adding new features,
modifying and/or shuffling codes to avoid being captured by
an anti-malware engine, etc. However, the variants still inherit
intrinsic behaviors from the original codes.
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A. Profile Similarity
The profile of Morstar in Fig. 2 shows that a malware needs
to access specific resources, such as files, Windows registries,
and libraries, to accomplish its malicious task. Those resource
accessed by the API calls may form the intrinsic behaviors.
Hence, the similarity function considers each distinct API
with its accessed resources and parameters as an element for
similarity calculation. To quantify the similarity of malware,
the Jaccard distance, dJ(X,Y ), defined as in Eq. 1, is used
in this paper to calculate the similarity of a pair of profiles X
and Y .
dJ(X,Y ) = 1− |X ∩ Y ||X ∪ Y | (1)
|X ∩Y | means the number of elements common in both X
and Y , and |X ∪Y | means the number of distinct elements in
the union of X and Y . Let D represent the Jaccard distance
matrix that every element Di,j = dJ(i, j) is the Jaccard
distance of profiles i and j. The range of Jaccard distance
is between zero (i.e., X and Y are statistically identical) to
one (i.e., X and Y do not have any Windows API in common).
B. Malware Behavior Clustering
To demonstrate the family relationship between malwares,
we take the Jaccard distance matrix (D) to perform the
Unweighted Pair Group Method with Arithmetic Mean (UP-
GMA) [21], listed in Algo. 1, which is a bottom-up hierar-
chical clustering method, to construct the phylogenetic tree.
Both Jaccard distance calculation and the UPGMA algorithm
are very efficient, whose computational complexity is O(n2)
for a naive implementation.
Data: A symmetric distance matrix d of size n× n
Result: A cluster C
foreach i in n do
Assign i to its own cluster C[i];
Create a one-leaf node for i at height 0;
end
while the number of current cluster > 1 do
Find 2 clusters i and j with minimal distance d[i][j];
Define a new cluster k by C[k] = C[i] ∪ C[j];
Define a new node k with children nodes i and j;
Place new node k at height d[i][j];
Add k to current clusters and remove cluster i and j;
Re-calculate the new distance matrix d;
/* d[x][k]=(d[x][i]+d[x][j])/2 */
end
Algorithm 1: The UPGMA Algorithm
The output of the UPGMA algorithm is a phylogenetic tree.
Fig. 6 shows the phylogenetic tree of Morstar family with 17
malware variants (identified by NCHC [22] report) and 31
spawned processes. In VMP, each malware is given a name
composed of a hex number and a numerical index. The y-axis
of the phylogenetic tree is the Jaccard distance between each
pair of malwares or malware behavior groups. For instance,
the Jaccard distance of 22f1e-0 and 6fbee-0 of G3 is
3
b
5
1
9
-0
7
9
c4
7
-1
9
3
0
b
c-
1
9
4
0
f7
-1
9
0
4
8
9
-1
8
1
c2
d
-0
2
7
f3
4
-0
2
8
e
1
7
-1
4
3
9
2
4
-1
f9
4
4
9
-1
0
3
a
e
4
-0
6
e
6
8
e
-1
e
9
5
5
b
-0
4
8
4
8
1
-0
7
3
9
a
b
-1
6
e
6
8
e
-0
f9
4
4
9
-0
e
9
5
5
b
-1
9
4
0
f7
-0
9
3
0
b
c-
0
8
1
c2
d
-1
7
9
c4
7
-0
7
3
9
a
b
-0
4
8
4
8
1
-1
4
3
9
2
4
-0
2
7
f3
4
-1
2
8
e
1
7
-0
0
3
a
e
4
-1
9
0
4
8
9
-0
2
2
f1
e
-0
6
fb
e
e
-0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
G1
G2
G3
Fig. 6: The phylogenetic tree of malware family Morstar.
0.37. The shorter distance means higher similarity. In Fig 6, if
the distance threshold is set to 0.5, the tree can identify three
major groups G1, G2 and G3 in this family. More experiment
results and discussions of threshold settings are presented in
Section V.
C. Malware Behavior Characteristics
Each group of the phylogenetic tree has unique behavior,
which can be ascertained by a collection of API calls. For a
group G, let C(G) be the common set of APIs with parameters
and return values shared by all its children. In practice, an
endurance value α < 1 is set, such that when more than
1 − α of its children have the API call (with parameters and
return values), the API call is included in C(G). Let P be G’s
parent in the phylogenetic tree. Then we define the distinct
characteristics of G, D(G), as all the APIs in C(G) but not
in C(P ), denoted as follows.
D(G) = C(G) \ C(P ) (2)
We then generate the characteristics of each group of the
phylogenetic tree. When a new malware is captured, these
characteristics can be used to classify the new malware into
one of the behavior group with the highest similarity against
its D(.) in the phylogenetic tree or none of the groups if the
captured malware is not similar to any group. A qualitative
explanation of the behavior difference from the security per-
spective will be given in Section V.
V. EVALUATIONS
A. System Platform
The platform uses off-the-shelf machines (Intel i7-3770S
3.1 GHz CPU with 8 GB RAM, Gigabit Ethernet, and 500
GB hard disk) with 64-bit Ubuntu 12.04 LTS (Linux kernel
3.11.0.26) as host OS. The TEMU/QEMU [12], [13] is em-
ployed as VMM, and the guest OS is a vanilla Windows XP
SP3. The configuration of a VM is a single core CPU at 3.1
GHz with 1GB RAM and 20 GB hard disk.
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TABLE II: The statistics of API calls of malware families and benign programs
File Registry Process Library
Create Copy Delete Query Create Delete SetValue Create Open Thread WinExec LoadLibrary
Korgo 8.6 1.0 0.0 131.3 12.0 1.0 10.7 1.4 2.5 1.0 1.0 24.0
Pinfi 16.5 1.2 0.1 189.6 19.5 1.2 20.2 2.4 1.9 1.0 1.2 25.9
Sality 12.3 0.8 2.3 466.3 18.1 125.8 388.0 0.4 9.8 2.4 1.0 23.0
Virut 7.0 1.0 0.0 119.1 16.7 1.0 14.4 1.0 2.2 1.0 1.0 23.8
IE 197.0 0.0 6.0 1015.0 34.0 0.3 40.0 0.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 42.0
Chrome 93.0 1.0 10.0 409.0 94.0 0.0 8.0 1.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 46.0
MSN 14.0 0.0 0.0 350.0 19.0 0.0 19.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.0
MS Paint 4.0 0.0 0.0 188.0 21.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.0
B. Malware Data Sets
In the evaluations, two malware data sets are used that both
are provided by the National Center for High-Performance
Computing (NCHC), Taiwan [22]. The first set, 40Bot, was
collected in late 2011, consisting of four well-labeled botnet
families (Virut, Sality, Korgo and Pinfi) with 10 variants of
each family. The second set, 419Mal, has 272 malwares (which
fork 419 processes in total) collected from April 2014 to
October 2014 from a collaborated honeynet run by NCHC.
From the records of VirusTotal, the first-seen date of the
419Mal malwares were from August 2009 to October 2014. In
the evaluation, each malware runs on a VM for 300 seconds
to generate its profile (as in Fig. 2) that their profile size is up
to 334 KB with 57 KB in average.
C. API Calling Statistics and Usages
40Bot and 4 benign programs (Internet Explorer, Google
Chrome, MSN Messenger and MS Paint) are profiled and
examined to demonstrate the behavior similarity of each mal-
ware family and their differences with benign programs. It is
expected that each malware family has its unique characteris-
tics, and has certain distinctions with other families and benign
programs. Table II shows the statistics of average numbers of
APIs called by malware families and benign programs. The
findings of interesting API usages are elaborated below.
Process-related APIs. The APIs CreateProcess,
WinExec, OpenProcess and CreateRemoteThread
fall into this category. It is common for malware to spawn
new processes for malicious jobs, using CreateProcess
and WinExec. On the contrary, IE only opens new process
named IEXPLORER.EXE by using OpenProcess. Their
difference can be observed from the process column of Ta-
ble II. Malware tends to use WinExec to execute another
program, but none of the selected benign programs do so. For
example, Korgo uses WinExec with command line parameter:
C:\WINDOWS\system32\zaegr.exe to start a malware
process. The usage of process-related APIs is quite different
in the implementations of malware and benign programs, due
to different purposed objective and style of coding practice.
CopyFile and DeleteFile. Most of the malware use
CopyFile to make a copy of the malware binary to Windows
system folder or temporary folder for later execution. The
filenames are usually random names, such as vwjop.exe.
Sality deletes several files, which are all temporary files
created by itself. For IE and Chrome, they only delete HTTP
cookies and temporary HTML files in the browser’s temporary
folder. While the same API is used by both malware and
benign program, the parameters are totally different.
CreateFile. The CreateFile function has a parame-
ter creationDisposition with values CREATE_NEW,
CREATE_ALWAYS or OPEN_EXISTING. From the observa-
tion, malwares usually use the first two values to create files in
the system folder for later use, and use the last one to read or
execute existing files, while IE only uses OPEN_EXISTING
for reading cookies, cached HTML and font files from its
temporary folder and font folder only. Again, the differences
are embedded in the parameter values.
RegCreateKey, RegSetValue and RegQueryValue. Mal-
ware may modify or add a registry to change the behavior
of the infected host, such as adding new service, changing
the host name or domain name (as Korgo), changing firewall
settings (as Sality), disabling Limited User Account (as Sality),
etc. In addition, some malware tries to register itself as a
service, so that it will be executed automatically after system
reboots. The above operations can be distinguished from the
parameters used in the APIs.
RegDeleteKey. Malware tends to delete registry keys to
remove system features. For instance, Sality deletes all registry
keys under a subkey SafeBoot. Deleting this key prevents
the user from booting into Safe Mode, which makes the user
unable to fix the infected host.
LoadLibrary. Malware may load third-party library files
from a non-system directory, but not the four benign programs.
The above findings and the statistics in Table II show that
malware families have different API calling patterns and the
usages of parameters with benign programs, as well as among
different families, which motivates further study of the usage
of API parameters in malware profiling.
D. Family Similarity – Jaccard Distance
Table III shows the average Jaccard distance and standard
deviation among the variants of each malware family in 40Bot
and their average distances with IE, denoted as dJ(.) and
dJ(., IE), respectively. It is clear that the average distance
within a malware family is much smaller (i.e., more coherent
in their behaviors) than the average distance between a mal-
ware family and IE. The execution behaviors of the variants in
Korgo are most similar to each other (with the average distance
0.1471) among all the families. On the other hand, the average
distance between Sality variants is higher (0.5151); however,
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TABLE III: The Jaccard distance and statistics of malware families with Internet Explorer
Korgo Pinif Sality Virut
Avg. dJ (.) 0.1471 (0.1660) 0.5080 (0.2055) 0.5151 (0.2575) 0.4403 (0.2346)
Avg. dJ (., IE) 0.8730 (0.0041) 0.8828 (0.0265) 0.9289 (0.0388) 0.8601 (0.0169)
Gap 0.7258 0.3748 0.4138 0.4198
T-Test 2.09347E-30 8.18355E-16 8.30675E-14 1.96907E-15
Avg. dJ (.), no par 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0311 (0.0333) 0.0535 (0.0593) 0.0311 (0.0333)
Avg. dJ (., IE), no par 0.3571 (0.0000) 0.3700 (0.0197) 0.3054 (0.0389) 0.3700 (0.0197)
Avg. dJ (., GC), no par 0.2857 (0.0000) 0.3000 (0.0218) 0.3690 (0.0306) 0.3000 (0.0218)
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Fig. 7: The phylogenetic trees of four malware families with
four benign programs.
it is still sufficient to distinguish the family members from IE
(0.9289). The degree of code modification of malware family
results in different average Jaccard distance. The p-values of
T-test of all malware families with IE reject the false null
hypotheses that IE and malware variants belong to the same
group.
The bottom rows of Table III lists the Jaccard distances
of profiles without the parameters and return values of API
calls (denoted as no par), which shows relatively poor distinc-
tion between malwares and both Internet Explorer (IE) and
Google Chrome (GC), e.g., 0.3571 between Korgo and IE,
and 0.2857 between Korgo and GC. As Korgo and IE (GC)
share around 63% (71%) Windows APIs in their programs,
without considering parameters and return values make them
indistinguishable. This shows the drawback to use API names
only in distinguishing between software behaviors.
Fig. 7 shows the phylogenetic tree of malware families with
the four benign programs to visualize the family construction
and their associated Jaccard distances. It is interesting to
observe that the benign programs cluster with malwares only
with very high Jaccard distances. For instance, in Fig. 7(a),
Chrome clusters Korgo family at Jaccard distance around 0.8.
The construction of each malware family tree presents its own
evolution pattern (i.e., code alternation history). For instance,
Sality family members have a sequence of code alternations,
while Korgo family members present two major behavior
groups.
TABLE IV: The significant characteristics of Morstar variants
Group Size |C(G)| |D(G)| Samples of Distinct Characteristics
G1 14 610 490 RegCreateKey: P3Sites, P3Global;
RegSetValue: Shell Folders;
RegSetValue: ProxyEnable;
RegCreateKey: CmdMappingIt
G2 14 304 184 CreateProcessInternal;
RegCreateKey: Policies;
LoadLibrary: netapi32;
RegCreateKey: Blocked
G3 2 120 0 ∅
E. Family Similarity – Phylogenetic Tree
In this section, an intensive analysis of a malware family
Morstar is presented to exemplify the functionality and capa-
bility of the proposed scheme. Fig. 6 is the phylogenetic tree
of the malware family Morstar with three major groups when
a threshold value is set at 0.5. After further investigations,
it is observed that G1 launches a File Explorer, removes the
browsing records, changes some Internet settings, and sets up
an auto-execution file on the system drive, G2 checks the
system services in the host, makes a copy of the malware
binary and executes it, and G3 is similar to G2, but the
execution trace is much shorter that indicates unsuccessful
attacks during the period of profile generation.
The phylogenetic tree faithfully shows the intrinsic be-
haviors and relationships inside each subtree and among
subtrees. By referring to published documents, Morstar is an
adware/trojan which is bundled with other software installers.
Apparently, the variant 3b519-0, the leftmost one in Fig. 6,
is an exception case in this family. The Jacquard distance is
large enough (0.9488) to determine that it is an outlier. It is
not clear why some detection engines classify this variant into
Morstar family that it impels to study the discrepancy among
detection engines.
Table IV shows the statistics and characteristics of the three
major groups in Fig. 6. For example, G1 has 14 malware
processes, and 610 Windows API calls are common among
the members in G1. Within these 610 API calls, there are
490 calls are identified as the distinct characteristics of G1
by Eq. 2. The distinct characteristics of the malware groups
in Table IV match the observations. Take G1 as an example
that it creates two malicious registry keys, P3Sites and
P3Global to modify the setting of IE. It also changes
the location of folder redirection, e.g., Desktop, Start Menu,
and My Document, by modifying the registry of Shell
Folders. It disables the HTTP proxy by modifying registry
ARXIV, MAY 2017 9
key ProxyEnable to avoid being monitored. It modifies
the registry CmdMappingIt to change the buttons on the
Command Bar of IE. The above APIs are discovered as the
distinct characteristics in VMP.
For G2, one of distinct characteristics is that it invokes
CreateProcessInternal API to create a process from
Windows TEMP directory. It later changes the settings of
Windows Explorer by modifying registry Policies. The
variants in this group load a specific library, netapi32,
which is not loaded by the variants in G1. It also blocks many
shell extensions in Windows system that changes the behavior
of Windows systems.
G3 has only two variants that have 120 common API calls.
From the manual analysis, besides querying registries, the
variants only create one file and one Windows registry, which
are considered as unsuccessful attacks during the period of
profile generation.
F. Pairwise Classification Score
Each anti-malware detection engine has their own schemes
to name a malware and to define a malware family. Un-
fortunately, the malware families and their construction ra-
tionales have great discrepancies among different engines,
which demands a metric to evaluate the behavior classification
capability and accuracy of different anti-malware detection
engines. Some websites, such as VirusTotal [18], analyze and
consolidate malwares detected by detection engines to provide
a list of malwares and their detection names returned by
each engine. As we can see in VirusTotal, a single malware
(identified by its hash value) may have different given names
by different engines.
Since there has no ground truth of how to define a malware
family, we leverage the peer voting concept to design a voting
mechanism to determinate which detection engine has ’better’
family grouping capability. We propose a metric, Pairwise
Classification Score (PCS), for the evaluation of goodness of
detection engines against the proposed VMI-based behavior
profiles while using them in family grouping. The intuition of
PCS adopts the idea of crowd intelligence that a good detection
engine should be acclaimed by other engines. Assume there
are n malwares, denoted as Mi, and m detection engines,
denoted as Ex. In this case, we can construct a table with
n × m cells, and for a cell (i, x), it contains the detection
string of Mi by Ex.
There is an important assumption of PSC that we cannot
directly use cell (i, x) and (i, y) for peer voting, since Ex
and Ey may use different malware naming scheme. Take the
malware sample in Fig. 2 for example, Avira names it as ‘AP-
PL/Firseria.A.15’, Kaspersky names it as ‘Win32.Morstar.ba’
and Sophos calls it ‘Solimba Installer’. In this case, while
voting, we take a pair of Mi and Mj as the voting basis.
To evaluate the goodness of Ex by using Ey , we consult the
cells at (i, x), (j, x), (i, y) and (j, y). If Ex says Mi and Mj
belong to the same family (i.e., cell (i, x) and (j, x) share
the same family name under Ex’s naming scheme), and Ey
also says so (i.e., cell (i, y) and (j, y) share the same family
name under Ey’s naming scheme), then Ey gives Ex a positive
point; otherwise negative. On the other hand, if Ex says Mi
and Mj are not in the same family, and Ey also says so, then
a positive point is given to Ex by Ey as well.
Let Ox(i) be the malware family of Mi given by Ex and the
value is NULL if Ex fails to detect this malware. Let Ix(i, j)
be an indicator function, which indicates if two malwares, Mi
and Mj , are considered to be in the same family by Ex, which
is defined as below.
Ix(i, j) =

+1 if Ox(i) = Ox(j)
0 if Ox(i) or Ox(j) is NULL
−1 if Ox(i) 6= Ox(j)
(3)
Then, the Pairwise Classification Score of a detection engine
Ex, denoted as PCSx, is determined by referencing all m
engines on all C(n, 2) pairs of malwares. Let Wx be the
weight for Ex (and in our work, it is calculated by the portion
of malwares detected by Ex). Px(y) is the approval rate of
engine x from engine y. Intuitively, the higher PCSx indicates
a more recognized engine. Note that since naming schemes
are different engine by engine, the proposed PCS method is
a much more proper way to evaluate malwares classification
results among multiple engines.
PCSx =
1
m
×Wx ×
m∑
y=1
Px(y) (4)
where
Wx = 1− P (Ox(i) = NULL) (5)
Px(y) = P (Iy(i, j) = +1 | Ix(i, j) = +1)
+ P (Iy(i, j) = −1 | Ix(i, j) = −1)
(6)
G. Detection Engine Performance Comparisons
Fig. 8 shows the PCS values of the proposed VMP system,
56 engines listed by VirusTotal plus three types of detection
engines (N-Group, N-Gram, and Text Mining) built for com-
parisons. The value in the parenthesis of each engine in Fig.
8 is the number of malwares detected by the engine. Note
that the PCS values do not imply high detection numbers and
vice versa. The N-Group engine clusters the malwares into
N groups. The N-Gram engines consider N consecutive APIs
as a behavior unit in the profile (that will affect the Jaccard
distance calculation). The Text Mining engine generates a
classifier using the text description of each malware.
N-Group. In the comparison, two engines (1-Group and
419-Group) are built as two extremes without any knowledge
of malware. 1-Group clusters the 419 malware processes into
one big family and achieves PCS = 0.0261, and 419-Group
generates a family for each malware process and achieves PCS
= 0.1703.
N-Gram. Inspired by Forrest’s work [23], we study the
effectiveness of using N consecutive API calls (denoted as
N-Gram) in malware family grouping that the case considers
parameters and return values is denoted as N-Gram Y, and
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Fig. 9: Jaccard Distances of Malwares with benign software
using N-Gram
the case does not consider parameters and return values is
denoted as N-Gram N. (Note the proposed VMP system is 1-
Gram Y.) Fig. 9 shows the Jaccard distance between benign
software and four malware families (of 40Bot) from 1-Gram to
12-Gram. Note that the obvious problem of N-Gram approach
is high computation overhead that N-Gram costs O(N) times
of 1-Gram and the space complexity is O(dN ), where d is the
number of hooked APIs in VMP.
In Fig. 9a, it shows that the Jaccard distances of N-Gram N
with benign software going up with the increase of N , and get
saturated when N is larger than 10. Fig. 9b demonstrates the
benefit of considering parameters and return values (i.e., N-
Gram Y) that 1-Gram Y already achieves the Jaccard value
as high as 9-Gram N.
In Fig. 8, it also presents the results of N-Gram Y and N-
Gram N with threshold = 0.3. Their PCS values are 0.3462,
0.3513, 0.3534, and 0.3996 for N-Gram Y, when N= 1, 2, 4,
and 8, respectively, and 0.2658, 0.3127, 0.3534, and 0.3580 for
N-Gram N. Even for 1-Gram Y, the PCS value is on par with
8-Gram N, which shows the benefit of considering parameters
and return values.
Text Mining. As every detection engine give its description
of each detected malware manually, the Text Mining engine
collects the descriptions from all engines as its description of
the malware, and applies the text mining algorithm modified
from ACIRD [24] to generate malware families. A list of stop
word is prepared, such as “Win32”, “Variant”, “TROJ GEN”,
special symbols and strings, and punctuations, to remove them
from the malware description.
Once the bag-of-word frequency matrix is generated, cosine
similarity is calculated between each pair of malwares, Mi and
Mj . If their cosine similarity is smaller than a pre-specified
threshold value, we consider Mi and Mj are in the same group,
i.e., IText Mining(i, j) = +1 in Eq. 3. With the threshold
value 0.7, the Text Mining engine achieves its best PCS at
0.3736. It is not surprising that the Text Mining approach
performs well since it takes advantages of the descriptions
of all 56 detection engines prepared by the security experts.
On the other hand, the Text Mining approach highly depends
on the quality of manual descriptions.
VMP Performance. The VMP system (i.e., 1-Gram Y)
achieves a high PCS = 0.3462, just next to two well-managed
detection engines. The major reason is that a malware may
spawn several child processes that VMP considers each pro-
cess independently by its behavior in family, while all other
detection engines consider the child processes in the same
malware family with their parent. Although we believe VMP
works correctly in the aspect of behavior clustering, most other
engines may disagree and give negative evaluations.
H. 10-fold Testing
In this subsection, a 10-fold testing is performed to examine
the performance of VMP in classifying unseen malware. For
each test, 42 malwares are randomly selected from 419Mal
as the testing data (as the unseen malwares), and the rest 377
malwares are used as the training data. The test repeats for 30
times in this experiment.
First, the training data is used to build the corresponding
phylogenetic tree, groups and their distinct characteristics.
Then, every testing malware is fed into the phylogenetic tree
to calculate the most similar group by comparing the distinct
characteristics of a group and the testing malware. If the
grouping outcome is the not same with the original VMP
phylogenetic tree of 419Mal, the grouping result is negative;
otherwise, positive.
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TABLE V: 10-fold Testing on 419Mal
Threshold Groups Negative Rate (%) Single-member Rate (%)
0.2 92 0.7143 13.4921
0.3 81 1.9048 11.8254
0.4 62 3.4127 9.7619
0.5 54 7.4603 6.6666
Table V shows the results of 10-fold testing for different
thresholds. For instance, if the threshold is set to 0.3, there
are 81 groups are identified in the constructed phylogenetic
tree and only 1.9048% malware processes (0.8 out of 42) are
assigned to a wrong group. There are 11.8254% (4.9666 out of
42) of testing malware processes that form a single member
malware group in the original phylogenetic tree and in the
testing phase, these malwares cannot be classified into any
group as it is supposed to be. As expected, if the Jaccard
distance threshold is low, then the number of groups increases
and their characteristics get strict and precise. In this case, the
negative rate becomes low with many one-member groups and
the opposite for high threshold.
VI. RELATED WORK
A. Profiling Subject
Bayer et al. [10] published an analysis report based on the
malicious code samples (total 901,294 unique samples) that
were collected by Anubis [11] during 2007–2008. They pro-
vide an overview of observed behavior among these samples.
The file system, registry, network, GUI, and process-related
activities are the most commonly shared behavior by these
malwares.
There are many ways in which system call data [25] could
be used to characterize the behavior of programs, such as
enumerating sequences [23], [26], frequency-based method
and data mining approach [27]. Usually, the result can be used
to compare the execution behavior of a known malware against
that of a set of benign programs [28]. If any pattern observed
is out of the predefined model, an anomaly is detected. Some
literature [29], [30] also focus on Windows API calls.
In our work, we come out the similar result but we focus
ons Windows API to populate malware profile. Moreover,
we recorded the parameters and the return values with the
Windows API calls that these malwares use. Our experiments
show that the Windows AIP calls may be the same, but the
parameters could reveal different semantics.
Some researchers focus on the higher-level semantic-
meaningful behavior of different malware, e.g., botnet network
connection pattern or e-mail propagation activity. BotHunter
[31] constructs a bot infection dialog model by a set of loosely
ordered communication. BotSniffer [32] detects bots within
the same botnet since their activities have spatial-temporal
correlation and similarity. BotMiner [33] performs cross clus-
ter correlation to identify groups of compromised machines
that shares similar botnet communication and activity patterns.
Sekar et al. [34] proposed a specification-based technique
to detect attacks as deviations from a normal model. All
above researches focus on developing specifications of hosts
and routers (rather than network) and building protocol state
machine to detect anomalies. Such ‘profile’ needs manual
analysis and prior knowledge to construct, which VMP only
relies on runtime execution traces.
B. Virtual Machine Introspection
Garfinkel [2] proposed an architecture for intrusion de-
tection using virtual machine introspection (VMI) technique.
An IDS guest is installed with the monitored guest, and it
implemented an OS interface library to interact with the virtual
machine monitor (VMM) interface to obtain the VM state of
the monitored guest (e.g., memory, register, and I/O devices) to
further construct higher-level OS structures (e.g., process and
virtual memory). They provide six sample security policies
and monitor them with a modified VMware Workstation. The
ReVirt [35] targets on moving security logging mechanism
into a virtual machine to provide better integrity. The security
logging mechanism works as a loadable kernel module in the
host operating system to inspect the interrupts for logging
and replying. Chen et al. [19] also stated that secure logging
and intrusion detection could benefit from the virtualized
environment.
VMwatcher [3] overcame the semantic gap challenge to
reconstruct internal semantic views (e.g., files, processes, and
kernel modules) of a VM. VMwatcher proposed a view
comparison-based detection to detect anomalies. They corrob-
orate an internal view (generated from inside the VM) with an
external view (generated from outside the VM) of the same
objects of interest and detect the existence of hidden malware.
Lares [36], [37] is a framework that can control an application
running in an untrusted guest VM by inserting protected
hooks into the execution flow of a process to be monitored.
These hooks transfer control to a security VM that checks
the monitored application using VMI and security policies.
Ether [38] can even perform VMI to analysis malware’s system
calls via Intel’s VT-x hardware virtualization extensions on
Xen hypervisor. Nitro [9] realizes system call hooks in KVM.
We anticipate that VMI research is a promising approach for
monitoring and logging malware activities due to its isolation
and transparent property.
Cuckoo Sandbox [39] is a malware analysis system that
takes the advantage of virtualization technique as well. The
most difference between Cockoo and VMP system is that
we do not need to install any additional agent inside the
guest OS. Cuckoo’s agent is an in-guest XMLRPC server that
helps the host to retrieve guest information. On the contrary,
VMP leverages VMI technique to retrieve the process list
information, the address of hooked dynamic loaded library,
etc.
The main difference of our proposed mechanism is that
we focus on the high-level Windows API calls to describe
the activities taken by the malware, and we tracking all the
behaviors from the viewpoint of tainted analysis. Every file or
registry that a process (and its spawned processes) access is
monitored and traced. Our profiling mechanism stays outside
the VM Guest as a part of QEMU plug-in to inspect the guest
information.
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C. Behavior Analysis
In 1996, Forrest [23], [40] introduced a concept – self – for
anomaly detection by defining a normal process using a short-
range correlation of its system calls. They create a database
by using the sequences of system calls from the normal
processes. Then, any unseen sequence indicates anomalies
of the current testing process. Their experiment showed the
longer consecutive calls are used to define ’self’, the more
accurate result it is to detect an anomaly. Their experiments
demonstrated the result of 5, 6, and 11 consecutive system
calls.
Some behavior analysis focus on malware clustering and
similarity problem. Bailey et al. [41] pointed out inconsis-
tencies in labeling by anti-malware vendors and present an
automated classification system. They also pointed out that
system call may be at a level that is too low for abstracting
semantically meaningful information. Thus, they defined the
behavior of malware in terms of non-transient state changes
(e.g., spawned process name, modified registry keys, and mod-
ified file names) that the malware causes on the system. The
use normalized compression distance (NCD) as the distance
function to construct relationships between malware.
Karim et al. [42] generate phylogeny for Internet Worms
by comparing permuted variants of programs. The result may
help forensic analysts investigate new specimens, and assist in
reconciling malware naming inconsistencies.
Bayer et al. [43] proposed a profile based on the operating
system objects (e.g., file or registry key) and system calls on
Anubis [11], and they focused on developing novel clustering
technique that scales well and produces precise results.
Schultz et al. [7], [44] were the first to introduce the concept
of data mining for detecting malware. They used three different
static features for malware classification: Portable Executable
(PE), strings and byte sequences. Then, Kolter et al. [45] used
n-gram sequence detect malicious executables.
Kong et al. [46] present a malware classification based on
function call graph with a learning algorithm. Islam et al. [47]
used both static and dynamic features to classify malware.
Leita et al. [48] combined clustering techniques based on static
and behavioral characteristics of the malware samples.
As we seen above, several techniques are used in the past
researches. However, we point out that some features in our
proposed profile, such as high-level APIs, runtime parameters
and return values, spawned child processes, are the essential
to malware behavior profiling.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we propose the VMP scheme to generate
malware profile and construct phylogenetic tree to group mal-
ware behaviors into families. We then discuss the importance
of malware family and its identification. We also proposed
the Pairwise Classification Score to evaluate the goodness
of family classification of multiple anti-virus engines using
different malware family naming scheme.
The VMI approach is engineered to record the API calls
with parameters and return values as the malware profile.
The VMP approach bridges the semantics between machine
execution and program notation. The generated phylogenetic
trees can appropriately identify malware families and clearly
distinguish between benign programs and variants of a mal-
ware family. As there is no benchmark for malware family
construction, we propose a voting-like intelligence based ap-
proach, called PCS, to compare the coherency of a detection
engine with all others. The results show VMP performs better
than most of other malware detection engines, and compatible
with Text Mining and N-Gram N approach.
In addition, we construct a website (http://140.112.107.39/
index/) for the proposed VMP system, which is built on the
top of a distributed task queue system and multiple virtual
machines running VMP to perform malware profiling. An
uploaded executable will be profiled by VMP for 5 minutes
and the corresponding profile can be downloaded on the
website later.
It deserves further investigations to find out the set of API
calls and resources substantial to distinguish different malware
families. In addition, we only considered API calls for profile
generation in this study, while other information, such as
network communications and packet contents, could allow a
better understanding of malware behavior. The inclusion of
such information in malware profiling will be our next task.
In this paper, we only present the VMP scheme and a possible
approach that we do not investigate for best similarity/distance
functions and machine learning approaches for malware family
construction, neither do we fine tune on the thresholds used in
VMP, which we believe there is much room for improvement.
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